Philosophy 148

Spring 2005

Number Title Instructor Days/time Room
148 Probability and Induction Fitelson MWF 3-4 126 Barrows

What is probability? How is probability useful for understanding inductive inference? Is there such a thing as inductive logic? If so, how does it relate to deductive logic, and what role does probability play in inductive logic? And, how is inductive logic related to inductive epistemology? These are the main (general) questions we will address in this course. Some specific topics we’ll discuss are: Hempel’s paradox of confirmation, Goodman’s “new riddle of induction”, Carnapian inductive logic, contemporary Bayesian confirmation theory and Bayesian epistemology, and various puzzles and paradoxes involving probability and evidence.

Prerequisites. PHIL 12A, and willingness to engage both in mathematical and philosophical work.

All readings for the course will be provided via the course website.

Previously taught: SP04 (Fitelson).