(B.A., Philosophy, Politics, & Economics, University of Oxford, 2017; MPhil, Philosophy, University of St Andrews, 2020). I spend much of my time trying to use formal tools to tackle problems in areas of ethics including our duties to help those in need, the right to privacy, population ethics, axiology, animal ethics, equality, and desert.

Previously I worked on the philosophy of logic. My MPhil thesis addressed the question of how many correct logics there are, and defended logical monism from the twin threats of logical nihilism and logical pluralism. If you’re intrigued—or looking for something to send you to sleep—you can check out the papers below.

Outside of philosophy, I enjoy climbing, backpacking, stand-up comedy, and being in close proximity to various non-human animals.

Here is a copy of my CV.

If you want, you can follow me on Academia and ResearchGate. Please don’t hesitate to shoot me an email if you’d like to get in touch!

Papers

Evershed, J. W. (2021). Double Trouble for Logical Pluralists. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 121(3), 411–424. DOI: 10.1093/arisoc/aoab005

This paper argues that various forms of logical pluralism are inconsistent with the normativity of logic as they entail logically contradictory claims about how agents ought to reason.

Evershed, J. W. (2021). Another Way Logic Might Be Normative. Synthese, 199(3), 5861-5881. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-021-03049-z

This paper argues that, in addition to logic (potentially) being normative for the combinations of beliefs that we may have, it is also normative for the methods by which we may form our beliefs.